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The Struggle to Police Foreign Subcontractors in Iraq and Afghanistan

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Fool Me Twice?
Foreign subcontracting can also mean greater risks for U.S. troops and personnel.

USAID funds intended for Iraqi trash collection as part of its now-shuttered $644 million Community Stabilization Program were “being extorted by at least one known militia leader,” with “adverse consequences” for American troops, according to a 2008 USAID Inspector General report. The program to improve community services was run by an American non-profit group, International Relief and Development, which in turn hired Iraqi subcontractors.

“Evidence in USAID’s report suggested that similar problems may exist elsewhere in ,” said Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for reconstruction. A U.S. policy “specifying that local contractors receive priority consideration for contracts” increases the risk of fraud, he told a House oversight committee in June.

The Pentagon’s Iraqi First program, launched in 2006, sought to expand subcontracting to Iraqis as a way to create jobs and build good will. The program inspired a similar Afghan First program. But with no reliable databases about local contractors, “the vetting process presents a very real and difficult problem, especially at the subcontractor level, Bowen said.

Similar problems have been noted with subcontractors in hired to provide for supply routes and construction sites.

Raymond DiNunzio, the head of investigations for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, said that in some cases involving reconstruction projects, “without performing any subcontract work, Afghan-owned companies have absconded with initial startup fees only to re-emerge under new identities to repeat the fraudulent scheme.”

Perhaps more seriously the U.S. government “does not have the ability to monitor Afghan security contractors or determine the nature of their affiliation or allegiance,” DiNunzio said.

DiNunzio was referring to a problem dubbed “Warlord, Inc.” by the House oversight subcommittee on national security. It found many private security subcontractors were warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who compete with the Afghan central government for power. Their interests “are in fundamental conflict with U.S. aims to build a strong Afghan government,” according to a subcommittee report. Some subcontractors are suspected of bribing the Taliban not to attack trucks on certain routes, while other bribes flow to Afghan government officials, further fueling corruption, the report said.

Solutions?
Experts say some simple measures could help separate the minority of bad subcontractor companies from the majority of honest ones.

“Photographs, fingerprints, or retina scans would provide a reliable identification mechanism and prevent corrupt Afghans from securing repeat reconstruction business,” says DiNunzio, the U.S. reconstruction investigator. The State Department already does this with its local and third-country contractor employees. It matches the biometric data with U.S. databases at the FBI and Defense Department “to ensure that contractor and subcontractor employees are not a risk to the public trust,” said Cathy Read, a State Department official.

Another proposed solution would require prime contractors like or DynCorp to share names of blacklisted subcontractors and terminated employees with the government to create a centralized database of questionable companies and individuals.

Even some companies that have been subcontractors have agreed with the concept. “As a small business, any tool that we have that could help us identify those bad apples, if you will, we would welcome,” said Mark Krens, the chief financial officer at The Diplomatic Group, a subcontractor to Fluor. (Click HERE for original article)

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10 Comments


The comments posted on this site are the sole opinion of the comment poster and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of MsSparky.com™

  1. Comment by JHowds:

    Based on the above story, how is Tamimi still allowed to operate the Kuwait DFACs contract? Back in 2008 Agility beat their price by nearly 75%. Tamimi protested based on the fact that Agility had an unfair advantage due to its Sultan Center (TSC) ties and could sell any unused FFV back to the TSC. Hello, those ties are simple business efficiencies, not illegal. FYI….I am a staunch opponent of Agility. Somehow, GAO decided the protest was worthwhile, threw out the award, and allowed Tamimi to remain on the contract. Tamimi actually filed several protests and the word on the street is that GAO couldn’t figure out how NOT to deny them. Hence, they awarded the follow on contract to Tamimi as well despite them having Agility’s prices from the initial award. WTF?!

    Can anyone else add more facts to this suspicious contract?

  2. Comment by Keven Barnes:

    Is this the Department of State’s retina scan test to detect corrupt subcontractors ?

    http://www.scribd.com/full/36588926?access_key=key-2dcx7ljokfwxq2vgh4pt

    We all know the GAO are told what to do by the DLA and DoD. They are just following orders.

    • Comment by JHowds:

      Also, what about the Subsistence Prime Vendor award to Anham? GAO decided to dismiss, not deny KGL’s protest and is now forcing DSCP to amend the solicitation.

      Keven, maybe you can decipher what that means. Does that mean the contract is “still up for grabs” like the KGL Chairman stated a few weeks back? If bidders must provide amended bids, how can DSCP allow Anham to continue work? In my read of the situation, amended bids means a further evaluation must occur with the final awardee to be determined. Or is this simply GAO and DSCP crossing their Ts and dotting their Is before confirming their initial selection?

      I also saw via FOIA that InterGlobal (the third bidder) has submitted two protests, but I’m not aware of the status of either. Can anyone fill Ms Sparky readers in?

      Apologies, I’ve been out of the loop for a few weeks. :(

      • Comment by Keven Barnes:

        Dismissed means the award stands unless another contractor has a GAO protest also. What are the other GAO decisions ?

        Speaking of other GAO Protests and the DLA’s private $ 5.7 million solicitation
        SP4510-10-R-1004
        after a message from ARU’s LuLu (on her way out the door) that has local contractor’s up in arms enough to file protests to the GAO. I see the following have filed protests:

        The last solicitation to draw that many Protests was the corrupted Kuwait Shuttle Bus contract where Rock Island’s Justin Trine and Jake Adrian used an amateurish EXCEL document after bidding closed which couldn’t add 2 + 2 to draw the Protests to keep HETCO (was that by design Rock Island ??) rolling for a few more months while awarding to an unqualified company with no buses, no drivers and no maintenance facility. It is no wonder Trine disappeared from Rock Island – but why is Adrian still there ?

        Protesters of DLA’s Diettel’s Private $ 5.7 million solicitation, SP4510-10-R-1004, DRMO that bypassed Fedbizopps are:

        Al Jameh Group General Trading & Contracting (SP4510-10-R-1004)
        Department of Defense : Defense Logistics Agency
        Quick View Quick view toggle Outcome: Not Decided Status: Case Currently Open

        Latvian Connection Trading and Construction, LLC (SP4510-10-R-1004)
        Department of Defense : Defense Logistics Agency
        Quick View Quick view toggle Outcome: Not Decided Status: Case Currently Open

        Trade Links Logistics General Trading (SP4510-10-R-1004)
        Department of Defense : Defense Logistics Agency
        Quick View Quick view toggle Outcome: Not Decided Status: Case Currently Open

        Decision
        Matter of: Alalamiah Technology Group
        File: B-402707.2
        Date: June 29, 2010
        Dismissed

  3. Comment by Keven Barnes:

    Take a read through this and tell me why the U.S. Army and the DOJ cannot put the subcontractors on the EPLS. Do you see SOFA written in Title 48. KGL and Agility have learned this the hard way. They bid on United States Federal Contracts, not a Afghanistan Khrarzi Corrupt Contract or a Kuwait Civil Contract. And not only that, when they got the contract, they signed they did not pay a bribe or offer to pay a bribe and they were not requested for a kickback. The subcontractor saw all the terms and conditions. If they don’t read English, maybe they shouldn’t be given the contract.

    Stop making excuses for the DOJ and the Army. They are just as much part of the corruption as the dog and pony show they put on to put down a KBR SCA. Usually the DOJ, the Army and the Air Force are reserved for disavowing their association with criminals for murder and then they extended it to corruption (well with Camp Arifjan at 30 – no wonder) If you notice, the DOJ are now extending their cover-up to DoD LOGCAP Contractors and other Prime Contractors who are the subject of criminal investigations. Way to go Holder – Accomplice No 1.

    Here is what the law says DOJ and Army. Maybe you think no one is watching your cover-up of the subcontractors or in this case LOGCAP Prime Contractor KBR.

    TITLE 48 – FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM

    CHAPTER 1 – FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION

    SUBCHAPTER A – GENERAL

    PART 3 – IMPROPER BUSINESS PRACTICES AND PERSONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

    3.502 – 2 – Subcontractor kickbacks.

    The Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 (41 U.S.C. 5158) was passed to deter subcontractors from making payments and contractors from accepting payments for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding favorable treatment in connection with a prime contract or a subcontract relating to a prime contract. The Act (a) Prohibits any person from (1) Providing, attempting to provide, or offering to provide any kickback; (2) Soliciting, accepting, or attempting to accept any kickbacks; or (3) Including, directly or indirectly, the amount of any kickback in the contract price charged by a subcontractor to a prime contractor or a higher tier subcontractor or in the contract price charged by a prime contractor to the United States.

    (b) Imposes criminal penalties on any person who knowingly and willfully engages in the prohibited conduct addressed in paragraph (a) of this subsection.

    (c) Provides for the recovery of civil penalties by the United States from any person who knowingly engages in such prohibited conduct and from any person whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee provides, accepts, or charges a kickback.

    (d) Provides that (1) The contracting officer may offset the amount of a kickback against monies owed by the United States to the prime contractor under the prime contract to which such kickback relates; (2) The contracting officer may direct a prime contractor to withhold from any sums owed to a subcontract under a subcontractor of the prime contract the amount of any kickback which was or may be offset against the prime contractor under subparagraph (d)(1) of this subsection; and (3) An offset under subparagraph (d)(1) or a direction under subparagraph (d)(2) of this subsection is a claim by the Government for the purposes of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.

    (e) Authorizes contracting officers to order that sums withheld under subparagraph (d)(2) of this subsection be paid to the contracting agency, or if the sum has already been offset against the prime contractor, that it be retained by the prime contractor.

    (f) Requires the prime contractor to notify the contracting officer when the withholding under subparagraph (d)(2) of this subsection has been accomplished unless the amount withheld has been paid to the Government.

    (g) Requires a prime contractor or subcontractor to report in writing to the inspector general of the contracting agency, the head of the contracting agency if the agency does not have an inspector general, or the Department of Justice any possible violation of the Act when the prime contractor or subcontractor has reasonable grounds to believe such violation may have occurred.

    (h) Provides that, for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has been a violation of the Act with respect to any prime contract, the General Accounting Office and the inspector general of the contracting agency, or a representative of such contracting agency designated by the head of such agency if the agency does not have an inspector general, shall have access to and may inspect the facilities and audit the books and records, including any electronic data or records, of any prime contractor or subcontractor under a prime contract awarded by such agency.

    (i) Requires each contracting agency to include in each prime contract exceeding $100,000 for other than commercial items (see part 12), a requirement that the prime contractor shall (1) Have in place and follow reasonable procedures designed to prevent and detect violations of the Act in its own operations and direct business relationships (e.g., company ethics rules prohibiting kickbacks by employees, agents, or subcontractors; education programs for new employees and subcontractors, explaining policies about kickbacks, related company procedures and the consequences of detection; procurement procedures to minimize the opportunity for kickbacks; audit procedures designed to detect kickbacks; periodic surveys of subcontractors to elicit information about kickbacks; procedures to report kickbacks to law enforcement officials; annual declarations by employees of gifts or gratuities received from subcontractors; annual employee declarations that they have violated no company ethics rules; personnel practices that document unethical or illegal behavior and make such information available to prospective employers); and (2) Cooperate fully with any Federal agency investigating a possible violation of the Act.

    (j) Notwithstanding paragraph (i) of this subsection, a prime contractor shall cooperate fully with any Federal government agency investigating a violation of Section 3 of the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 (41 U.S.C. 5158).

    So, why are the DOJ and Amry covering up for contractors violation the FAR and not getting them on the EPLS ?

  4. Comment by gonewild99:

    gonewild99 – Obviously I edited your comment. Please contact me about this affidavit. I emailed you at the email you provided. I would like a link to the source or an original document so I can post that. ~Ms Sparky

  5. Comment by Ex-Fluor Foreman:

    why did they wait this long to get rid of them?

  6. Comment by quick watch:

    News from Jalalalabad,Afghanistan. It seems that when one speaks with Tier 1 Fluor workers that this is not the Fluor that they know back in the USA. This is a current theme from them all.
    The hatchet again is falling on ex-pats.
    Recently they told Jeff Clark that he was terminated. Why? It was because he approved timesheets of some people who de-mobed. Here one is sent from Fob to Fob. One cannot know all of the workers or where they are at all times. Jeff took over the duties of one supervisor on R and R. He did not know he de-mobed. In any case, about $10,000 in salary was paid out to ex-workers. The questions arise as to how did this happen. Where is HR in all this since people de-mobed? Why wasn’t their SAP numbers placed on hold? Why is it that this was all of J. Clark’s fault? Why wasn’t the other supervisors , Mark and Jim, also terminated for this action as they also approved some time sheets?
    Then in the Material Yard 2 workers were fired because of not following safety. The problems here are as follows. Management from Bagram violated the same rules but were not fired. This according to the company policy should be no more than a write up. But it is the people on the bottom who go home, just llike KBR.
    Last week a email was sent out about not contacting bagram or corporate. Why is this? To hide the mismanagement of the management here at JAF.
    Why is Jim Luchsinger is allowed to take more than 45 days for medical and return when others are not?
    These are some reasons people are fed up with this new employer. The old boy system is in place but only for management.

  1. Ping from » The Struggle to Police Foreign Subcontractors in Iraq and … | Afghanistan Today

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