LOGCAP IV Myth or Legend?

Army segues from LOGCAP III to IV - or Not

Mar 27, 2009
By ASC Public Affairs

More companies, contracts bring better value to military

With the recent announcement by President Barack Obama downsizing forces in Iraq and increasing in Afghanistan, the Army is adapting its contracted support for troops in overseas contingency operations.

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program will continue, with LOGCAP IV employing a new strategy developed by the Army Sustainment Command, in consultation with its higher headquarters, the Army Materiel Command and combatant commanders, who represent LOGCAP’s ultimate consumers — U.S. service members and civilians in the field.

It draws from the lessons learned during the past five years and calls for improved administration and oversight.

LOGCAP was established in 1985, primarily to pre-plan for contingencies and to leverage existing civilian resources. The current version of LOGCAP, known as LOGCAP III, was awarded in 2001 to the firm Kellogg, Brown and Root Services and has been used primarily in support of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, Jordan, Kenya, Uzbekistan and Georgia.

AMC first assumed management responsibilities in 1997 for LOGCAP II, which was used until 2001 in support of American forces in the Philippines, Columbia, Ecuador, Haiti, East Timor and Panama. DynCorp International LLC was awarded that contract.

The LOGCAP IV acquisition plan called for three, multi-year, best-value performance contracts with subsequent requirements to be competed as task orders among the three performance contractors. DynCorp, Fluor Intercontinental Inc. and KBR were awarded contracts in June 2007. In addition, the plan called for awarding a planning support contract, separate from the performance contracts.

With LOGCAP IV, the Army awarded three performance contractors to deliver the services, instead of just one as under LOGCAP III.

Splitting the planning and performance contracts allows the Army to manage LOGCAP actions more effectively. Performance contractors will compete for individual LOGCAP task orders, fostering a competitive situation designed to control costs and enhance quality.

Services include supply operations, field operations, engineering and construction, communication networks, transportation and cargo, facilities maintenance and repair.

A fourth contractor, Serco-North America, received the award of a multi-year, government program management support services contract in February 2007.

Status of LOGCAP IV
Remaining transition issues include complicating factors, the Army’s method for resolution, specific steps planned, and a general timeline.

LOGCAP IV is under way in Southwest Asia, meeting evolving requirements. A strategy to ensure uninterrupted services for the transition of requirements currently under LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV is also underway.

Kuwait:
The transition in Kuwait is complicated. A LOGCAP IV task order for Kuwait awarded to DynCorp in November 2008 met protest by an unsuccessful bidder, as was a task order for Udairi Air Field awarded to DynCorp in December 2008. A third LOGCAP IV task order awarded to Fluor also was protested.

The Army Sustainment Command authorized DynCorp and Fluor to proceed under the task orders following denial of the protests by the Government Accountability Office in February 2009.

Three task orders transitioned to LOGCAP IV were announced, competed, awarded, then protested. LOGCAP III services continued until protests were resolved. The task orders are:

• Task Order, 147, Kuwait Area of Operations Support

• Task Order 157, Udairi Airfield

• Task Order 161, Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment

Upon completion of the transition, all LOGCAP work in Kuwait will be performed under LOGCAP IV.

Afghanistan:
Operations in Afghanistan present daunting challenges. U.S. forces, often operating out of austere forward operating bases, must contend with temperature extremes and rugged terrain. The existence of multi-national coalition forces and troop expansion must also be factored in.

Urgent new requirements in Afghanistan have caused delay in the commencement of the legacy task order competition process for the transition of LOGCAP work in Afghanistan.

Certain task orders awarded under LOGCAP III are set to expire in late March, but because of active combat operations and the difficulties to physically transition, task orders will be extended to ensure uninterrupted service and to accommodate the LOGCAP IV transition.

Once initiated, it is expected that the transition could take from six to nine months, depending upon the mission, specific needs of forward operating bases and challenges inherent to the situation and environment. Examples include the size of the FOB, its location – which could affect incoming supplies – enemy attacks, and roads known to have improvised explosive devices.

In compliance with the president’s increase of forces in Afghanistan, all new work identified will be competed under LOGCAP IV. A look at Regional Commands (RCs) indicate:

• RC East: Emergency work awarded to Fluor to expand four existing FOBs, with a recent request to create eight new FOBs – pending requirement.

• RC South: Emergency work to expand eight FOBs is underway after being competitively awarded to Fluor under LOGCAP IV.

• RC East/South: Six task orders have been rolled into two for this region with a target award of early April.

Iraq:
A guiding principle of the transition is that it will be conditions-based, as agreed by all key stakeholders. Transition from LOGCAP III to IV is complicated by a number of sensitive, as well as practical, issues.

In-country concerns over transition focus on cost, base closures, augmented contractor presence, and likely operational impact.

For example, near-term base closure work may be handled more efficiently and effectively under LOGCAP III rather than shifting to LOGCAP IV – an effort which could result in increased costs required to mobilize additional contractors (with no long-term benefits due to the closed-ended nature of the requirement), added complexity due to the necessary coordination required between gaining and losing contractors, and increased turbulence during the transition.

Department of Defense transition planning is underway with mission changes impacting the final outcome. The original intent was to break up the single task order into five base life support task order operations and a corps logistics service support services/transportation support task order. However, President Obama’s plan to draw down forces in Iraq is being addressed based on theater realignment decisions.

Conclusion
LOGCAP IV is the future for the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, especially as that program relates to overseas contingency operations. Many issues will affect the transition of requirements from LOGCAP III as well as the long-term use of LOGCAP IV. The practical realities, as well as the overall strategy, are being carefully weighed and incorporated into solutions providing the best support to U.S. forces and its allies.

(Editor’s note: Lee Thompson, executive director, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Army Sustainment Command, contributed to this article.)  original article Link

On September 28 an article stated that the Army does not have an adequate plan in place  for this transition? (read Ms Sparky’s Post Here)

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What the hell? Are they going for the Guinness World Record for the longest cluster f***?  Let’s take a little walk down memory lane shall we?

• February 2006 the Army announced its intent to split the LOGCAP contract up.
• June 2007, the Army Awarded the contract to KBR, Fluor and DynCorp
  • The contract award was challenged by two unsuccessful bidders
    1. Contingency Management Group LLC, a team composed of AECOM Government Services, Shaw Group and PAE Government Services
    2. IAP Worldwide Services Inc.
• October 2007  the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sustained the protests. (I count 20 months pissed away at this point)
• April 2008 the Army re-awarded the LOGCAP Contract to the original 3 bidders KBR, Fluor and DynCorp. (2 years and counting)

Meanwhile prior to this re-award and even prior to the  original ”open competition” bid KBR was facing allegations of fraud, employee rape, soldier electrocutions, tainted water etc..

One has to wonder what does KBR and the Army have in common that would make it so desirable to have these alleged killers, bandits and rapists continue to be invited to bid on a contracts much less allow them to keep 100% of the contract while allegedly placating disgruntled taxpayers and disgusted lawmakers by “transitioning” into a competitive, cost saving, model of efficiency.   Thumbing their nose is more like it.  I believe there is a common bond and here is why:

U.S. Army  Brigadier General Craig Peterson (Ret.)

U.S. Army Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan (Ret.)

U.S. Army  Brigadier General Remo Butler (Ret.)

U.S. Army Lieutenant General Joseph Cosumano (Ret.)

U.S. Army Lieutenant General Steven L. Arnold (Ret.)

U.S. Army Lieutenant General Guy A. J. LaBoa (Ret.)

U.S. Army Major General Mike Mayo (Ret.)

U.S. Army Major General Larry Lust (Ret.)

Am I the only one seeing a pattern here, the above list is current and former members of the holier than thou “Top Five?”  Now if the Army awards the contracts and the contractor receiving these contract awards have padded their management with the Army Retired Generals Club, is there potential  collusion happening here?    I believe the answer to be YES!  Has anyone bothered to investigate connections between those awarding the contracts and the previous working relationships between these individuals?  What about General Jerome Johnson’s bogus testimony and his link to Georgia where both the sitting KBR Program Manager, at the time of the testimony, and his replacement hailed from?  HELLO, RED FLAG!

What about our soldiers that have died or are permanently disable or dying due to possible negligence?  They are the backbone of our country and not only do they deserve better than what they have been handed, they deserve answers.  If someone put their lives in jeopardy for personal advancement or a corporation’s bottom line, all culpable parties need to face the legal ramifications to the fullest extent of the law.  There should be no weasel clause for intentionally putting the members of our armed services at risk.  It is an impalpable offense by those who have been entrusted with the lives and safety of our men and women in uniform.  The “once and always” a general needs to stand up and accept their fate for putting those men and women at risk for profit.

My suggestion is that everyone click on the link to Army Sustainment Command’s Website and use the email address provided to fill them in on what is really happening in the field, they are obviously out of touch with Field Ops and I dare say to reality.

It has now been 3 years 8 months since the announcement of the LOGCAP IV contract and very little, if anything, has changed.

I believe that the odds of seeing the Loch Ness Monster are greater than ever seeing LOGCAP IV fully implemented.

Foresti

Change Begins With You & Me

Other Related Posts From Ms Sparky

1. KBR LOGCAP IV Iraq transition update
2. KBR’s LOGCAP III contract extended in Iraq LOGCAP IV task orders canceled
3. Will Dyncorp and Fluor protest the CTP task order award for LOGCAP IV
4. KBR awarded $2.3B LOGCAP IV task order in Iraq after poor performance evaluation (updated 02/28/2010)
5. LOGCAP IV for Dummies (Updated 05-27-2010)

Written by Forseti. This entry was posted on October 3, 2009 at 6:47 am and is filed under GOV. CONTRACTORS, KBR Contract, KBR Investigations, LOGCAP III - KBR, LOGCAP-Dyncorp, LOGCAP-Fluor, Senate & House Committee Hearings. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Tagged Gen. Jerome Johnson, LOGCAP IV You can leave a response or trackback from your own site.